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SEC/DOJ Parallel Proceedings:




Parallel proceedings are "simultaneous, adjudicative proceedings that (1)
arise out of a single set of transactions, and (2) are directed against the same
defendant or defendants."' Parallel proceedings may include investigations by
any federal regulatory agency, civil injunctive or penalty actions, administrative
disciplinary proceedings, cease and desist proceedings, private actions (including
both class and derivative actions), proceedings by self-regulatory agencies,
various state proceedings, grand jury inquiries, and/or criminal prosecutions.
The term is most frequently used to refer to a civil and a criminal action by a
federal agency arising from the same activities.2 For the purposes of this Article,
"parallel proceeding" will refer to a simultaneous civil investigation or
proceeding by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
and criminal investigation or proceeding by the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
through the United States Attorney's Office regarding alleged violations of the
federal securities laws
Part II of this Article introduces traditional authority, both statutory and case
law, for the SEC and the DOJ to conduct parallel proceedings. Part III briefly
describes the SEC's methods and procedures for gathering and sharing
information with the DOJ. Part IV describes the rights and privileges afforded
to suspects, while Part V describes the rights and privileges that suspects are not
afforded despite the obviously unfair situations such suspects must face as a
result. Part VI describes the procedures used by targets to combat these unfair
situations, with particular attention afforded to the procedure of moving for a
stay of the civil proceeding pending the resolution of the criminal proceeding.
Part VII analyzes the judicial standards utilized by courts in determining whether
to grant the stay of the civil proceeding, focusing on apparent recent judicial
trends. Part VIII describes criticism of SEC/DOJ parallel proceedings, as well
* B.S., Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville 1998; J.D., Brooklyn Law
School 2001. Mr. Hunter is a member of the New York Bar and practices law in New
York City. Mr. Hunter wishes to thank Professor Norman Poser of Brooklyn Law School
for his expertise and guidance.
1. 21 MARVIN G. PIcKHoLz, SECURITIES CRIMES § 3.01 (1998).
2. Id.
3. For a recent example of an SEC/DOJ parallel proceeding, see William H.
Donaldson, Statement at News Conference Announcing Charges in Qwest Matter (Feb.
25, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch022503whd.htm.
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as the effectiveness of such criticism, while Part IX discusses why such criticism
is largely inappropriate.
II. TRADITIONAL STATUTORY AND CASE LAW AUTHORITIES FOR
PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
A. Statutory Authorities
Both the Securities Act of 1933' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934'
explicitly empower the SEC to investigate possible violations of federal
securities laws while contemplating both civil and criminal enforcement.
Furthermore, the 1933 Act and 1934 Act both allow the SEC to share any
information obtained through discovery with the DOJ. Section 20(b) of the 1933
Act provides, in relevant part:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is
engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute
or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this title, or any rule
or regulation prescribed under authority thereof, it may ... transmit
such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices
to the Attorney General who may, in his discretion, institute the
necessary criminal proceedings under this title.6
Similarly, Section 21(a) of the 1934 Act provides, in relevant part: "The
Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it deems
necessary to determine whether any person has violated, or is about to violate
any provision of this title[.]" 7 Section 21 (d)(1) of the 1934 Act further provides
that the SEC may "transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such
acts or practices.., to the Attorney General who may, in his discretion, institute
4. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77g-bbb (2000)).
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-mm (2000)).
6. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 20(b), 48 Stat. 74, 86 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2000)).
7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 21(a), 48 Stat. 881, 899 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (2000)).
[Vol. 68
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the necessary criminal proceedings under this chapter."'  These statutory
sections, thus, explicitly authorize cooperation between the SEC and the DOJ.
B. Case Law Authorities
This Part discusses several cases that have contributed to the currentjudicial
standards associated with SEC/DOJ parallel proceedings. The cases are
discussed below in chronological order beginning with the United States
Supreme Court's first discussion of parallel proceedings and continuing through
the seminal case addressing SEC/DOJ parallel proceedings, SEC v. Dresser
Industries.9
1. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States
As early as 1912, in Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United
States,"° the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that a course of conduct
or transaction could, under a single statute, become the subject of both criminal
and civil proceedings, either "simultaneously or successively," with discretion
to prevent injury in particular cases left to the courts." Reviewing an alleged
violation of the Sherman Act, the Court reasoned that "an imperative rule that the
civil suit must await the trial of the criminal action might result in injustice or
take from the statute a great deal of its power."' 2 The Standard Sanitary Court
reasoned that courts would retain discretion to prevent injury to either party, in
cases of parallel proceedings. Subsequently, the courts have exercised this
discretion in a variety of ways.
2. The Parrott Cases
The two Parrott cases illustrated the possible injuries associated with
parallel proceedings and how differently two separate courts might choose to
address such injuries. 3 In Parrott I, decided in 1965, during an SEC
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 21(e), 48 Stat. 881, 900 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2000)); see SEC v. Rubinstein, 95 F.R.D.
529, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The plain words of [Section 21(d)] authorize the SEC to
transmit evidence concerning [Defendant] to the Attorney General.").
9. 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980).
10. 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
11. Id. at 52.
12. Id.
13. United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965) ("Parrott I"); United
States v. Parrott, 315 F. Supp. 1012 (D.C.N.Y. 1969) ("Parrott IF), aff'd, 425 F.2d 972
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
2003]
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investigation, the defendants were advised of their rights, including their right
against self-incrimination. 4 They were not informed, however, that a referral
had been made to the U.S. Attorney's Office when they were called to testify in
a subsequent administrative hearing. 5 When the government returned an
indictment twenty-two months after the SEC's referral, the federal district court
in the District of Columbia dismissed it, stating that "the Government may not
bring a parallel civil proceeding and avail itself of civil discovery devices to
obtain evidence for a subsequent criminal proceeding."' 6  In Parrott II,
reviewing facts essentially identical to those in Parrott I, a federal district court
in New York concluded that the defendants had been properly advised of their
rights and that all the evidence in question was obtained from a proper SEC
investigation resulting from a valid SEC subpoena.' 7 As such, cooperation that
was forbidden by the Parrott I court was deemed appropriate by the Parrott II
court.
3. United States v. Kordel
In 1970, the Supreme Court revisited the holding of Standard Sanitary with
its decision in United States v. Kordel.' In Kordel, the defendants were
prosecuted for introducing misbranded drugs into commerce and causing drugs
to be misbranded after they had been shipped in interstate commence. 9 The
Court concluded that requiring government agencies to choose between bringing
criminal prosecution and pursuing civil relief would harm efforts to enforce
federal food and drug laws. The Court, therefore, held that civil proceedings
need not be postponed pending the resolution of parallel criminal proceedings
unless special circumstances make the postponement necessary to serve the
needs of justice.2" The Court stated that a stay of civil proceedings may be
proper where:
(1) the government has brought the parallel civil action solely for the
purposes of obtaining evidence for the criminal action,
(2) the defendant in the civil proceeding has not been warned of the
government contemplating to prosecute him criminally,
(3) the defendant does not have the benefit of the representation of
counsel,
14. Parrottl, 248 F. Supp. at 198.
15. Id. at 199.
16. Id. at 202.
17. Parrott I, 315 F. Supp. at 1015-16.
18. 397 U.S. 1 (1970).
19. Id. at 1.
20. Id. at 11-12.
[Vol. 68
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(4) the defendant fears prejudice resulting from pretrial publicity, or
(5) any other circumstances indicate that the criminal prosecution is
improper.21
The federal government may, however, proceed with related criminal and civil
actions arising from the same set of operative facts either simultaneously or
successively, absent these "special circumstances." 22 Although Kordel listed as
examples several factual situations that might require a stay of the civil
proceedings pending the resolution of the parallel criminal proceeding, the list
was not exhaustive and left practitioners with many questions regarding what
other factual situations constituted "special circumstances."
4. United States v. Fields
In 1978, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals offered strong support for
SEC/DOJ cooperation. In United States v. Fields,23 the court cited a report by
Congress stating that "[t]raditionally, there has been a close working relationship
between the Justice Department and the SEC. The Committee [on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce] fully expects that this cooperation between the two agencies
will continue., 24 The Fields court reasoned that preliminary communication
between the SEC and the United States Attorney is a "commendable example of
inter-agency cooperation" that (1) familiarizes the United States Attorney with
the complex facts of the case, (2) minimizes statute of limitations problems, and
(3) allows earlier initiation of criminal proceedings consistent with the
defendant's right to a speedy trial.25
5. SEC v. Dresser Industries
Following the same general trend as United States v. Fields, in 1980 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued its opinion in what has
become known as the seminal case addressing SEC/DOJ parallel proceedings,26
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 592 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
24. Id. at 646 n.19 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 10 (1977)) (alteration in
original).
25. Id. at 646.
26. Although Dresser is a decision from the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, and, therefore, not binding on other circuits, it is heavily cited in
secondary sources as the seminal case on SEC/DOJ parallel proceedings. See William
R. McLucas et al., Article: A Practitioner's Guide to the SEC's Investigative and
Enforcement Process, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 53, 101 (1997) ("The leading Commission case
dealing with parallel proceedings is SEC v. Dresser Industries."); see also DAVID H.
2003]
5
Hunter: Hunter: SEC/DOJ Parallel Proceedings:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc. 2 7 While investigating alleged "illegal and
questionable corporate payments," the SEC subpoenaed documents from
Dresser. Dresser moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum, 2 but the district
court denied Dresser's motion and ordered him to comply.29 In affirming the
decision of the district court, the court of appeals recognized that parallel
proceedings are "unobjectionable under ourjurisprudence," as long as the rights
of parties involved are not substantially prejudiced.3 ° The Dresser court cited
Kordel for the authority of courts to stay civil proceedings when the court deems
the stay necessary and held that this decision must be made in the "light of the
particular circumstances of the case," but noted that the strongest argument for
staying the civil proceeding until the completion of the parallel criminal
proceeding is when the party under indictment would be forced to defend a civil
proceeding regarding the same subject matter as the criminal proceeding.3 If the
civil proceeding is not deferred, several problems could arise, including: (1)
violating the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
(2) expanding discovery beyond the scope of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(b),3 2 (3) allowing the prosecution to gain access to the defense theory before
the criminal trial, or (4) prejudicing the case in some other unforeseen way." As
such, a court may be justified in deferring the civil proceeding if its delay would
not "seriously injure the public interest," although deferring civil discovery or
entering a protective order might be adequate as well. 4
The court then applied the facts of the case to these standards and found
that, because Dresser had not been indicted, his Fifth Amendment privilege was
not threatened (and Rule 16(b) was not yet in effect), and, thus, the case at bar
was "a far weaker one for staying the administrative investigation.""
Furthermore, the court noted, the subpoena did not require Dresser to reveal the
BARBER, LEGALINES SECURITIES REGULATION § V(A)(6)(c) (4th ed. 1999); RICHARD W.
JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1410 (8th ed. 1998);
Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12-B-5 (3d
ed. 1995); 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 9.5 (3d ed. 1995).
27. 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980).
28. In its motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum, Dresser argued that the SEC
subpoena was an abuse of the civil discovery process for the purpose of criminal
discovery and was an infringement on the role of the grand jury in independently
investigating alleged crimes. Id. at 1380.
29. Id. at 1370.
30. Id. at 1374.
31. Id. at 1375-76.
32. For a discussion of the parameters of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b), see infra Part V.C.
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theory of its defense in the criminal action.36 Accordingly, Dresser had failed to
show that the facts of this case necessitated a stay.
The court cited the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act as explicit authority for the
SEC to investigate possible violations of federal securities laws for the purposes
ofboth civil and criminal enforcement, and continued by discussing the necessity
of SEC/DOJ parallel proceedings to ensure that such enforcement is timely.37
The court reasoned that, in order to maintain the integrity of securities markets,
the SEC and the DOJ must both be able to act quickly" if either suspects that the
laws with which they are charged to enforce have been violated.39 Because
neither the SEC nor the DOJ can wait for the other to conclude its proceedings
before beginning the relevant actions, the court reasoned, parallel investigations
by these agencies should not be blocked without the showing of "special
circumstances" that would prejudice substantial rights of either party."
Dresser argued that the SEC's transmittal of Dresser's file to the DOJ was
identical to a "referral" under United States v. LaSalle National Bank,4' and,
thus, the SEC's power to subpoena lapsed afterwards.42 Under LaSalle, the IRS
may not exercise its summons authority to investigate possible violations of tax
laws after referring those violations to the DOJ. Alternatively, Dresser argued,
even if the SEC's transmittal was not identical to a "referral" under LaSalle, the
SEC could not enforce investigative subpoenas into the same matters as the
grand jury investigation.43
Analyzing LaSalle and applying its rationale to the case before it, the
Dresser court reasoned that both of Dresser's arguments were invalid because
the LaSalle rule applies only to the Internal Revenue Code44 and not to the
federal securities laws, where the SEC's civil authority continues after the DOJ
initiates a parallel proceeding. 4 The "policy interests" that the Supreme Court
identified in LaSalle' were only enunciated after the Court determined that the
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1376-77.
38. The statute of limitations for criminal securities fraud, for example, is five years
from the date on which the fraudulent action occurred. United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d
135, 138 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982)).
39. Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1377.
40. Id.
41. 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
42. Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1378.
43. Id.
44. The Internal Revenue Code states that the IRS's civil authority ceases once it
refers a case to the DOJ.
45. Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1378. According to the Court, "[t]he investigation of
Dresser based as it was on the staff's conclusion that Dresser may have engaged in
conduct seriously contravening the securities laws falls squarely within the Commission's
explicit investigatory authority." Id. at 1380 (footnote omitted).
46. Such policy interests were to avoid expanding the DOJ's discovery rights and
2003]
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IRS had no authority to issue a summons after it had referred a case to the DOJ.47
Because the SEC's authority remains post-indictment, no such "policy interests"
existed in this case.48 The Dresser court reasoned that, even if the "policy
interests" identified in LaSalle are relevant, they have "little practical
significance in this context."49 The limitations on criminal discovery, found in
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 15-17, are not applicable until an
indictment has been returned."0 Prior to the indictment's return, no possibility
exists that the DOJ could expand its discovery abilities because the subpoena
power of the grand jury is "as broad as-perhaps broader than-that of the
SEC.""
Dresser concentrated more heavily upon LaSalle's "policy interest" of
avoiding any infringement on the grand jury's role.52 Dresser first argued that
enforcement of the SEC subpoena would undermine grand jury secrecy
protections, given that the SEC subpoena requested access to many documents
which already had been subpoenaed by the grand jury.53 The court reasoned that,
because the documents requested by the SEC were created for independent,
corporate purposes and did not reveal what had occurred before the grand jury
(but rather only what had occurred in Dresser's foreign corporate operations),
those documents were not insulated from investigation in another forum.54
Dresser's second argument was that the SEC might choose selective documents
to provide to the grand jury through the DOJ.55 The court, acknowledging that
the SEC's policy is to provide the DOJ with continuing access to all its files,
held Dresser's argument to be "purely speculative" and found the presumption
that the SEC would pre-select documents in order to prejudice the grand jury
improper.56 The court further held that, because the grand jury members would
be aided by experts provided by federal regulatory agencies, pursuant to Rule
6(e), the efficiency and rationality of the process would be promoted. 7 If
Dresser was concerned about possible selective disclosure by the SEC, the court
of appeals reasoned, Dresser could negate any possible danger by providing
directly to the grand jury copies of any documents he provided to the SEC." The
to avoid usurping the grand jury's role as a principal tool of criminal accusation.
47. United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 312 (1978).





53. Id. at 1382.




58. Id. at 1384.
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Dresser court held, in conclusion, that "Dresser's invocation of LaSalle can avail
[him] nothing." 9
In discussing the policy of cooperation between the SEC and DOJ, the
court, after reiterating that both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act authorize the
SEC to share evidence with the DOJ for the purposes of initiating a criminal
proceeding, noted that the same statutes also impose no limitations as to when
the transmission of such evidence may occur.6" The court continued by citing
segments of the legislative history of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977,6" which explicitly state the expectations of both the Senate and the House
that the SEC and the DOJ will closely cooperate in the preparation of cases.62
The court acknowledged that, "[a]lthough the legislative history of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act is not directly probative of congressional intent governing
the [1933] and [1934] Acts, these statements by the 95th Congress are
nevertheless entitled to some weight."63 (The Dresser court reasoned that the
LaSalle Court's holding-that a "bad faith investigation" is one commenced
solely for criminal justice purposes-was the applicable standard.)64 An agency
"acts in good faith under the LaSalle conception," according to the court, "even
if it might use the information gained in the investigation for criminal
enforcement purposes as well."6
Although Dresser still left open what constitutes "special circumstances"
for the purpose of determining whether to grant a stay of a civil proceeding to a
defendant subjected to parallel proceedings, the case at least made the standard
easier for subsequent courts to analyze.
III. SEC PROCEDURES FOR GATHERING AND SHARING INFORMATION
An overview of the SEC's procedures for conducting investigations and
sharing information with the DOJ will help the reader understand the
problematic nature of parallel proceedings.
The SEC generally utilizes information from two types of sources: internal
and external.66 "Both types of sources are extremely important to the SEC in its
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1385.
61. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m,
78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. 11977)). For further discussion of this legislative history,
see discussion of United States v. Fields, supra Part II.B.4.
62. See Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1385-86.
63. Id. at 1386.
64. Id. at 1387 (citing United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 307-
08, 316, 316 n.18 (1978)).
65. Id.
66. J. WILLIAM HICKS, CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION UNDER
THE 1933 ACT § 2.02[2] (1995).
2003]
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enforcement of the federal securities laws. Internal information leading to the
discovery of violations of law can be obtained from filings under the 1933 and
1934 Acts.67 Additionally, surveillance of market activity helps detect unusual
trading patterns and possible violations of securities laws.68
Internal sources of information are also supplemented with external sources
of information. 69 Informants, public complaints,7" referrals from self-regulatory
organizations, and state and federal regulatory agencies often provide the SEC
with information regarding violations of the federal securities laws.7'
When the SEC's sources have provided enough information to indicate it
is necessary, an investigation is commenced, usually by the SEC's Division of
Enforcement. The SEC conducts investigations at two levels: informal and
formal. SEC investigations begin largely as informal investigations. At the
informal stage,72 formal authorization from the Commission is not required, but
SEC staff have no official power to compel the production of evidence from
parties73 and any cooperation by the parties during the informal investigation is
voluntary.74 At this stage of the investigation, the SEC will attempt to secure as
many documents as possible for the purposes of reconstructing the transaction(s)
in question.75 Although the SEC cannot compel the production of documents by
the target at this point, regulated entities (national securities exchanges,
brokerage firms, transfer agents, clearing agencies, etc.) can be compelled to
produce books and records they are required to maintain.76 Additionally, the
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 130 (3d
Cir. 1981); New York Stock Exchange Company Manual A-2, A- 18 (1977).
69. Rule 5(a) of the SEC's Rules of Practice states that "complaints received from
members of the public, communications from federal or state agencies, examinations of
filings made with the Commission, or otherwise" can initiate the informal inquiry, but
leads come from several other sources, as well. MARK STEINBERG & RALPH FERRARA,
SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT § 3.03 (1992 and Supp.
1998).
70. See Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Division of Enforcement
Complaint Center, at http://www.sec.gov/complaint.shtml (describing complaint
initiation procedures).
71. HICKS, supra note 66, § 2.02[2].
72. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (2002).
73. Id.; see also SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 738 n.1 (1984);
HICKS, supra note 66, § 2.02[3][b].
74. It is important to note, however, that a witness' refusal to answer a question
may provide sufficient basis for a Staff Attorney to seek a formal order. Ralph C. Ferrara
& Philip S. Khinda, SEC Enforcement Proceedings: Strategic Considerations for When
the Agency Comes Calling, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1143, 1150 (1999).
75. Ira Lee Sorkin & Arthur G. Jakoby, SEC Investigations, 18 REV. SEC. &
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subject of the investigation may submit a written statement of her position, called
a "Wells Submission,"77 regarding the investigation's subject matter."
Once the SEC exhausts all forms of voluntary cooperation (or has
suspicions regarding the credibility of cooperation it has received) and the staff
believes there is a "likelihood"79 of a violation, the Commission" can issue a
Formal Order of Investigation.8" Under Section 19(b) of the 1933 Act, 2 once a
formal order has been issued, the SEC staff can issue subpoenas duces tecum and
examine witnesses under oath.83 Further, the SEC is not required to indicate the
reasons for the subpoenas84 and the persons subpoenaed are financially
responsible for complying with the requirements of the subpoena.85 Federal law
does not require the SEC to notify the target of an investigation that it has issued
subpoenas to third parties,86 since providing a target notice of third-party
subpoenas might burden the discretionary powers of the SEC or hinder the
77. The term "Wells Submission" arises from the SEC's Advisory Committee on
Enforcement Policy (referred to as the "Wells Committee" after it first Chairman, Charles
Wells) and refers to a statement from a target used to address the legal and policy issues
why the SEC should decline to initiate an enforcement action. RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET
AL., supra note 26, at 1573-76. The opportunity to make a Wells Statement and the
required format is discussed in Securities Act Release No. 5320, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,829
(Nov. 9, 1972); see also 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (2002).
78. HICKS, supra note 66 § 2.02[3][b].
79. See SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 130 (3d Cir. 1981)
(discussing that the "likelihood" of a securities violation must exist before the SEC may
issue a Formal Order of Investigation).
80. Congress has granted investigative and subpoena power to the SEC, but not to
the individual staff members themselves. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(c), 77t(a), 78u(b) (2000).
81. See ALAN R. PALMITER, SECURrrIEs REGULATION: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS
361-62 (1998).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c) (2000).
83. See also Rule 4(b) of the SEC's Rules Relating to Investigations, 17 C.F.R. §
203.4(b) (2002) (specifying that the SEC delegates to the officers assigned to the
investigation the power to subpoena evidence or documents which they feel is material
to the inquiry).
84. SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1973)
(holding that the SEC's investigation should not be impeded by the requirement of
describing why each person was being subpoenaed).
85. SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding
that "[t]here is a continuing general duty to respond to governmental process; in
consequence, subpoenaed parties can legitimately be required to absorb reasonable
expenses of compliance with administrative subpoenas").
86. SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742 (1984) (holding that SEC
subpoenas are not subject to due process requirements because no legal rights come into
play during non-public SEC investigations, and the Sixth Amendment right to
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investigation by tipping off the targets who may then attempt to evade or impede
the investigation. 7
The staff will provide the witness with a standard form discussing various
routine uses, notices, and warnings regarding any information provided to the
SEC, whether a witness provides testimony voluntarily or in accordance with a
formal order.8 Further, any information provided to the SEC may be forwarded
to a number of government and/or regulatory agencies.
The SEC has the authority to initiate only civil and administrative
proceedings to investigate potential violations of federal securities laws, while
the DOJ has sole jurisdiction over criminal proceedings.8 9
When considering whether to refer a case to the DOJ, the SEC has
focused on four types of violations: (1) those involving organized
crime, (2) those committed by a chronic violator, (3) those where the
scheme posed a significant threat to investors, and (4) those involving
corruption of SEC staff or other government officials.9"
When providing information to the DOJ, there are two procedures by which the
U.S. Attorneys can request access to SEC files and information: formally and
informally.9
Under a formal referral by the SEC for criminal prosecution, authorized by
Section 24 of the 1933 Act,92 the SEC prepares a lengthy report detailing all
relevant facts upon which charges should be brought.93 This process is
extremely cumbersome and results in a delay in bringing criminal proceedings,
which may cause statutes of limitations to run, important documents to be lost,
87. Id. at 749-51.
88. See SEC Form 1662 ("Supplemental Information for Persons Requested to
Supply Information Voluntarily or Directed to Supply Information Pursuant to a
Commission Subpoena").
89. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(f) (2002). One exception to this rule is Rule 42(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which permits the court to appoint the SEC to
prosecute a criminal contempt charge. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) (contempt may be
prosecuted by "an attorney appointed by the court"); Frank v. United States, 384 F.2d
276,278 (10th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 395 U.S. 147 (1969); SEC v. Murphy, No. CV 75-2775,
1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14568, at **6-7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 1983) (nothing that neither
the 1933 Act or the 1934 Acts prohibit the SEC from being appointed by the court to
prosecute a criminal contempt charge arising from alleged disobedience of an injunction
obtained by the SEC, and the occurrence of such does not constitute a violation of the
defendant's due process rights).
90. Steven Amchen et al., Securities Fraud, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1037, 1093
(2002) (citing STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 69, § 6.15).
91. PICKHOLZ, supra note i, § 1.04[6].
92. 15 U.S.C. 77t(b) (2000).
93. PICKHOLZ, supra note I, § 1.04[6][a].
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and/or the failure of witnesses' memories.94 Although many considerations
deemed this time-consuming process necessary in the first few decades of the
SEC's existence," the DOJ now has a separate fraud section to handle securities
matters.96 Because increased understanding of securities matters by DOJ
officials has alleviated some of the oversight responsibilities of the SEC, the
formal method of referral is rarely used today.97
Today, the SEC generally relies on the less cumbersome informal process
known as "granting access,"98 which was developed to alert prosecutors to
possible criminal violations in a more timely manner.99 Most commonly, either
an SEC staff member will ask the SEC for authority to advise the DOJ about
information regarding a possible defendant or the DOJ can make a request which
is subsequently forwarded to the SEC.' With increasing frequency, however,
the DOJ relies on the SEC rules that allow United States Attorney's Offices
access to SEC investigatory files in order to bypass the referral procedures.'
The methods differ significantly, however, in the form and degree of
influence the SEC plays in the criminal prosecution. The SEC plays a more
active role in formal referrals and merely makes its files available to the DOJ in
informal referrals.
0 2
IV. TRADITIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AFFORDED TO
DEFENDANTS
While the SEC does possess a great deal of leverage and authority,
defendants possess a number of rights and privileges as well. During the
informal phase of the investigation, for example, the defendant has no
affirmative duty to comply with any requests by the SEC.0 3 Upon the issuance
of the Formal Order of Investigation by the Commission, the SEC's Rules
Relating to Investigations ("Rules") regulate the staff's activity.0 4 The Rules
provide the defendant with an unqualified right to counsel during the course of
94. PICKHOLZ, supra note 1, § 1.04[6][a].
95. Lack of sophistication in U.S. attorneys who dealt with financial fraud or the
lack of attention devoted by the U.S. Attorney's Office to financial crimes, for example.
96. Such as the Securities/Commodities Fraud Task Force of the U.S. Attorney's
Office in the Southern District of New York or the Business/Securities Fraud Section of
the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of New York.
97. PICKHOLZ, supra note 1, § 1.04[6][a].
98. See, e.g., Order Granting Access, SEC NEWS DIG., Oct. 24, 1988, at 1.
99. PICKHOLZ, supra note 1, § 1.04[6][a].
100. PICKHOLZ, supra note 1, § 1.04[6][a].
101. Amchen et al., supra note 90, at 1336.
102. Amchen et al., supra note 90, at 1336.
103. See supra Part III.
104. See 17 C.F.R. § 203.1 (2002).
2003]
13
Hunter: Hunter: SEC/DOJ Parallel Proceedings:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
the proceeding,'05 as well as an unqualified right to inspect the (1) Formal Order
of Investigation 0 6 and (2) official transcripts of the defendant's own
testimony.' 7 Additionally, subject to the SEC's approval, the Rules provide the
defendant with (1) a copy of the Formal Order of Investigation °8 and (2) a copy
of the defendant's documentary evidence, if such evidence is non-public
information.'0 9 These rules ensure that, even though a defendant may be
subjected to a very coercive environment when facing an SEC investigation, the
defendant is not totally without protection.
V. TRADITIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES NOT AFFORDED TO
DEFENDANTS
Although defendants faced with parallel proceedings are afforded the
aforementioned rights and privileges, many traditional privileges, including some
of those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, are not afforded. This leaves
defendants faced with some extremely pressing concerns, including concerns
related to self-incrimination, right to counsel, discovery, and collateral estoppel.
A. Self-Incrimination Concerns
The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person.., shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."' " The privilege against self-
incrimination protects a person from being forced to provide information that
might provide a direct link in a chain of evidence that might lead to his
conviction," ' and is said to reflect "our preference for an accusatorial rather than
an inquisitorial system of criminal justice.""' The privilege against self-
incrimination does not exist solely to protect a defendant at a criminal trial;
rather, the privilege may be invoked in proceedings, both state and federal, that
the defendant fears will eventually lead to a criminal trial.' ' A party may invoke
the privilege where the risk of criminal prosecution is "remote," ' 4 or even where
105. Id. § 203.7(b).
106. Id. § 203.7(a).
107. 1d. § 203.6.
108. Id. § 203.7(a).
109. Id. § 203.6.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
111. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
112. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
113. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,444-45 (1972); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 11 (1964); Murphy, 378 U.S. at 77-78.
114. In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, 620 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
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the party has received informal "assurances" that he will not be criminally
prosecuted."5
The decision to invoke one's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination does not come without consequences, however. While adverse
inferences may not be drawn against a criminal defendant who asserts his
privilege against self-incrimination," 6 the Fifth Amendment does not forbid the
finder of fact to draw adverse inferences against parties in a civil action when
they refuse to testify in response to questions posed to them. 7 Further, evidence
concealed through the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination may
not later be introduced by the defendant to support a claim or defense. For
example, if a defendant in an SEC/DOJ parallel proceeding invokes the privilege
to cease pre-trial civil discovery, the court has the authority to prevent the
defendant from presenting the evidence at the time of trial for his benefit, even
if the SEC independently receives evidence comparable to that which the witness
refused to provide.' "'
Conversely, testifying during the civil proceeding carries its own risks for
the defendant. Evidence or testimony presented by the defendant on his own
behalf in the civil suit may be used against him in a subsequent proceeding,
whether civil or criminal in nature." 9 In an SEC/DOJ parallel proceeding, this
leaves the defendant "faced with a 'double-edged sword' by having to choose
between self-incrimination in the SEC proceeding and self-incrimination in a
later criminal or civil proceeding."' 0
B. Right to Counsel Concerns
The Sixth Amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
115. Estate of Fisher v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 645, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1990);
Belmonte v. Lawson, 750 F. Supp. 735, 738-39 (E.D. Va. 1990).
116. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981).
117. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,318 (1976); SEC v. Graystone Nash, Inc.,
25 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the "invocation of the Fifth Amendment
poses substantial problems for an adverse party who is deprived of a source of
information that might conceivably be determinative in a search for the truth"); see also
SEC v. Rehtorik, 755 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (permitting the drawing of
adverse inferences in SEC civil securities fraud suit). But see SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d
674, 678 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that, in order for a finder of fact to draw an adverse
inference from a party's invocation of the Fifth Amendment, evidence independent of the
party's silence must exist).
118. See SEC v. Cymaticolor Corp., 106 F.R.D. 545, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
119. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 13 (1970).
120. Randy S. Eckers, Note, Unjust Justice in Parallel Proceedings: Preventing
Circumvention of Criminal Discovery Rules, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 109, 124 (1998).
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defense."'' A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel'22 may be undermined by the existence of parallel proceedings. For
example, the government may be able to obtain information that would normally
have been protected by the attorney-client or work product privileges. "This risk
could arise either during the pretrial phase, via such avenues as defense
attorney's questions during depositions, or as a result of the civil proceedings in
which prosecutors could gain access to defense counsel strategy."'23 If an
attorney reveals her work product, including her case theory and specific claims
and/or defenses, while defending the civil case, she may weaken the defendant's
position in the criminal case. 4
Regardless of these infringements upon the defendant's interest in effective
counsel, courts will probably not find any violation of a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights unless counsel in the civil proceeding completely fails to
protect the defendant's interest in the criminal proceeding.'25 As such, a
defendant's claim of a constitutional violation based on her being subjected to
parallel proceedings will most likely fail.
C. Discovery Concerns
Discovery in federal criminal cases is generally governed by Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendant is not entitled to the
statements of government witnesses, government attorneys, or any federal
agents.'26 Defendants are only entitled to receive:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements made by the accused; (2)
a copy of the defendant's prior record; (3) the results and reports of
any physical and mental evaluations, or scientific experiments, which
are either material to the preparation of the defense or are intended for
use at trial by the prosecution; and (4) a written summary of any expert
testimony the prosecution intends to use, including the experts'
qualifications, opinions, and the bases and reasons for those
opinions. '27
121. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
122. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (holding that the
Sixth Amendment "right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel").
123. Laila Abou-Rahme et al., Procedural Issues, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1061,
1089 (1998).
124. Note, Using Equitable Powers to Coordinate Parallel Civil and Criminal
Actions, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1023, 1032 (1985) [hereinafter Using Equitable Powers].
125. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-90 (1984),
126. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2).
127. Georgia A. Staton & Rene J. Scatena, Parallel Proceedings-A Discovery
Minefield, 34-Jul ARIZ. ATr'Y 17, 18 (1998) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)).
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Additionally, witness statements possessed by the prosecution are not
discoverable until the conclusion of that witness's testimony on direct
examination.' 28
Civil procedure, however, generally rejects criminal procedure's emphasis
on the preservation of an adversarial nature when such emphasis impedes the
"search for truth."'29  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for
"discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action ... if the information sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."'30
Specifically, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "permit a party to depose other
parties and witnesses, to serve interrogatories on other parties, and to examine
other parties' documents and tangible items."''
D. Collateral Estoppel Concerns
The collateral estoppel doctrine states that "issues litigated and determined
in a proceeding are binding for the parties involved should those issues arise in
any subsequent proceeding."' 32 The principal virtue of collateral estoppel is that
it "promotes judicial economy by reducing the burdens associated with revisiting
an issue already decided."'3 a The collateral estoppel doctrine may affect the
outcome of multiple proceedings, depending on the order in which the actions
are resolved.' When an issue that was necessary to the outcome of a
proceeding is litigated and decided by a final judgment on its merits, the party
against whom the issue was decided may not re-litigate the same issue in a
subsequent action.'35
128. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667-68 (1957).
129. Using Equitable Powers, supra note 124, at 1023.
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
131. See FED. R. CIv. P. 30, 33, 34; Using Equitable Powers, supra note 124, at
1029 n.28.
132. GILBERT POCKET SIZE LAW DICTIONARY 43 (1994).
133. SEC v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 303 (2d Cir. 1999).
134. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398 (1938) (holding that resj udicata
is not available to a defendant in a civil suit following acquittal in a criminal case);
Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F.2d 1074, 1077 (5th Cir. 1980) (allowing the application of
estoppel in an action arising from a prior criminal conviction during a civil suit by an
investor against a broker).
135. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979).
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1. Criminal Convictions and Guilty Pleas
Generally, a guilty plea or conviction in a criminal proceeding triggers the
application of collateral estoppel in subsequent civil litigation." 6 If a criminal
conviction is secured, issues that were considered as essential to the verdict of
the conviction need not be litigated again.'37 For example, in SEC v.
Gruenberg,"' the court held that, if a review of the allegations in each count of
the criminal indictment had the same identity of issues as the parallel SEC civil
complaint, a criminal proceeding will have collateral estoppel effect.'39 To
minimize the damaging affects of a guilty plea, a defendant may request
permission from the court to plead "nolo contendere"' 4 ° to avoid the collateral
effect of a guilty plea.' 4 ' The DOJ may be "reluctant to accept such pleas,
however, especially when they have sufficient evidence to [proceed] to trial."' 4
2. Criminal Acquittals
If a criminal acquittal is secured, the defendant is afforded nothing because
of the differing burdens of proof. '43 All issues will have to be fully re-litigated
because evidence that fails to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may still
136. See Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Cont'l Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 858 F.2d 1264, 1271 (7th Cir. 1988) (ruling that "issues actually
litigated for purposes of a criminal conviction conclusively establish those issues for
lateral [civil] litigation"); United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1527-28 (1 1th Cir.
1988) (holding that a guilty plea in a federal criminal proceeding is conclusive of all
issues that would have been determined by a conviction following a contested trial). But
see Alsco-Harvard Fraud Litig., 523 F. Supp. 790, 802 (D.D.C. 1981) (limiting collateral
estoppel to issues essential to defendant's guilty plea in a prior criminal proceeding).
137. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558,569 (1951); SEC
v. Westerfield, No. 94-6997, 1997 WL 282241, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1997); SEC v.
Grossman, 887 F. Supp. 649, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
138. 989 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1993).
139. Id. at 978.
140. A nolo contendere, or "no contest," plea "generally has no collateral estoppel
effects at all, nor is it admissible into evidence at a criminal or civil trial in federal court."
Jared Edward Mitchem, Parallel Proceedings: Concurrent Qui Tam and Grand Jury
Litigation, 51 ALA. L. REv. 391,404 (1999).
141. See Blohm v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 1542, 1554 n.l I (11 th Cir. 1993) (If
a defendant pleads nolo contendere, that defendant "does not expressly admit his guilt,
but nonetheless waives his right to trial and authorizes the court for the purposes of his
case to treat him as if he were guilty."); Refined Sugars, Inc. v. Southern Commodity
Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
142. Mitchem, supra note 140, at 404.
143. PICKHOLZ, supra note 1, § 3.06[3].
[Vol. 68
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss1/11
SEC/DOJ PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
sufficiently meet the civil standard of preponderance of the evidence.'44 As the
result of these differing standards, defendants can be harmed by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, but not benefitted.
VI. PROCEDURES DEFENDANTS USE TO COMBAT THESE SITUATIONS
To combat this inherent unfairness, defendants will most likely attempt to
seek redress from the courts, which have the sole discretion to resolve procedural
and constitutional issues presented by parallel proceedings.' 45 A federal civil
judge may enter "any order which justice requires to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."' 46
Although dismissal of a civil proceeding is extremely rare, depending on the
particular circumstances of a case, a court may (1) issue protective orders or (2)
stay civil discovery or the civil proceedings entirely. "'
A. Protective Orders
A court may enter a protective order when it concludes that the public
interest necessitates the denial of a stay, but still wishes to protect the
defendant's Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.' "In
theory, a protective seal acts directly on the source of the harms arising from
parallel proceedings by preventing the intermingling of the civil and criminal
actions."'49 Reliance on a protective order can be somewhat risky, however,
because protective orders are subject to judicial modification at any time 5 ° even
though a party may rely upon the protective order to his detriment.' Ifa party
144. See Eastern School v. United States, 381 F.2d 421, 438 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(acquittal of members of partnership in criminal action has no effect on counterclaims
of United States in civil action involving same partnership); Jones v. District of
Columbia, 212 F. Supp. 438, 449 (D.D.C. 1962) (civil action not barred by acquittal of
criminal charges although both actions based on same facts), aff'd, 323 F.2d 306 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); see also Peter Ball & Karen Pickett, Parallel Criminal and CivilProsecutions
in Massachusetts Federal Court, 46 B.B.J. 18 (Nov./Dec. 2002).
145. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n.27 (1970).
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
147. SEC v. Dresser, 628 F.2d 1368, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
148. See SEC v. Grossman, No. 87 Civ. 1031, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2213
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1987) (denying defendant's motion for a stay because of a desire to
proceed expeditiously with both proceedings, but entering a protective order forbidding
the SEC from disclosing any document or interrogatory to the DOJ).
149. Using Equitable Powers, supra note 124, at 1036-37.
150. United States v. GAR Corp., 596 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1979).
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cannot rely on a protective seal remaining in effect indefinitely, the party may not
wish to speak freely and, thus, the seal will not be a realistic option to a
defendant seeking to preserve her privilege against self-incrimination.
B. Stays
It is well-settled that, while courts have the power to issue a stay when the
interests of justice require it, the Constitution does not require a stay of a civil
action in a parallel proceeding."'2 Courts have broad discretion in granting or
denying a stay and their decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. '53 To determine whether or not to issue a stay, courts use a balancing
test by weighing the public interest in continuing the civil action against any
prejudice experienced by the defendant if the civil action is not stayed. 54 A stay
may be requested by either the government or the defendant.
Courts will often find a stay of civil discovery necessary where liberal
discovery will allow a litigant to gain an unfair advantage in a parallel criminal
prosecution. In Campbell v. Eastland,' a case in which a taxpayer attempted
to utilize a civil suit to gain discovery for a criminal case, Judge Wisdom held
that "[a]dministrative policy gives priority to the public interest in law
enforcement. This seems so necessary and wise that a trial judge should give
substantial weight to it in balancing the policy against the right of a civil litigant
to a reasonably prompt determination of his civil claims or liabilities."'5 6 The
United States Attorney may intervene in a federal civil action, pursuant to Rule
24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to seek a partial stay of discovery
when there is a parallel criminal proceeding, either anticipated or already
underway, and which involves common questions of law or fact.'57 Courts have
152. Kashi v. Gratsos, 790 F.2d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1986); Dresser, 628 F.2d at
1375 (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n.27 (1970)); SEC v. Downe, No.
92 Civ. 4092, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 753, at **45-46 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1993) (citing
Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248,255 (1936)); United States v. Certain Real
Property, 751 F. Supp. 1060, 1062 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Brock v. Tolkow, 109 F.R.D. 116,
119 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
153. Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55; Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198,
1203-04 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478,492 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
154. Amber Harding et al., Procedural Issues, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 923, 944
(2002).
155. 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962).
156. Id. at 487.
157. SEC v. Chestman, 861 F.2d 49, 50 (2d Cir. 1988) ("The government has a
discernible interest in intervening in order to prevent discovery in the civil case from
being used to circumvent the more limited scope of discovery in the criminal matter.");
SEC v. HGI, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 3866, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17377, at **3-4, 10
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1999) (granting the government's motion for a stay because "[t]he
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granted requests for stays of discovery by the government in order to protect the
integrity of pending criminal investigations both when an indictment has not yet
been returned,'58 as well as when an indictment has been returned.' 9
Courts seem to go to great lengths to grant a motion by the government to
stay the civil proceeding in a parallel proceeding. For instance, in SEC v.
Oakford Corp.,"'° after a sixty-day stay had ended without application for
renewal and discovery had begun, the SEC moved for a stay and then later
moved to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The court concluded that the
SEC had filed an action it had no intention of prosecuting and reprimanded the
SEC for such conduct, but nonetheless granted the SEC's application and
dismissed the case. 6' Further, although a defendant may argue that a stay is not
warranted because the DOJ's interest is adequately protected by the presence of
the SEC, courts have often recognized that the DOJ may have an interest that is
qualitatively different from the SEC's interest, and that the DOJ is better suited
to explain its need for intervention rather than have the SEC as its conduit.'62
Defendants tend to be less successful than the government when requesting
stays of civil proceedings. Although concerns favoring a stay may be heightened
when the government is the civil plaintiff, an indictment has issued, and/or both
actions stemmed from the same conduct, these concerns may be overridden when
the public interest in the civil proceeding would be harmed by the requested
stay. 163
Stays are granted under certain circumstances, however. For example, in
SEC v. Google,164 Judge Covello noted that several factors, such as the late
timing of the motion (which was filed at the close of discovery) coupled with the
interests of the SEC, the public, and the court, weighed against granting the stay.
Nevertheless, Judge Covello granted the stay, holding that the preservation of
public interest in the criminal investigation of this matter and the efficient administration
of litigation outweigh any prejudice to defendant"); Downe, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 753,
at *42.
158. See Downe, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *43; SEC v. Control Metals Corp., 57
F.R.D. 56, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (staying civil action pending grand jury investigation).
159. See SEC v. Joseph Doody IV, No. 01 Civ. 9879,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2055,
at **6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2002); HGI, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17377, at **3-4.
160. 181 F.R.D. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
161. Id. at 273; see also Chestman, 861 F.2d at 49 (in which the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the grant of a stay in a civil action pending the resolution of a
parallel criminal action, even though the SEC itself performed discovery prior to the civil
action).
162. Chestman, 861 F.2d at 50; In re Ivan F. Boesky Secs. Litig., 128 F.R.D. 47,
48-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
163. United States v. Certain Real Property, 751 F. Supp. 1060, 1062 (E.D.N.Y.
1989).
164. No. 3:95 cv 00420, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20878 (D. Conn. Apr. 30, 1997).
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defendant's privilege against incrimination was a more important consideration
than any inconvenience experienced by the SEC.1
65
The trend of courts to grant stay requests from the government but to deny
stay requests from private defendants has certainly been met with criticism. One
commentator, when questioned about his level of success in attaining a stay for
clients, summarized his analysis of parallel proceedings problems in securities
matters by stating:
I believe that whether the competing proceedings are IRS, SEC,
grand jury, FTC, or private damage actions, the trend of the law seems
to be that whenever the government wants to stop one of the parallel
proceedings, if it files a motion, the court will accommodate the
government. As a result, the private party cannot use, for example,
civil discovery in a private action, which would help him in defending
the grand jury investigation or subsequent criminal prosecution. On
the other hand, whenever a private party tries to stop the government
from going forward in the parallel proceeding-usually the IRS or the
grand jury-the courts almost invariably refuse to stop the government
from pursuing the parallel enforcement case.'66
VII. JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING WHETHER TO STAY
THE CIVIL PROCEEDING
In exercising their discretion to grant or deny a stay of a civil proceeding
pending the resolution of a pending criminal proceeding, courts search for "bad
faith" on the part of the government, as well as "special circumstances," as
introduced by the Kordel and Dresser courts. This Part analyzes the standards
courts use, focusing particularly on recent trends.
A. Traditional Standard-The "Bad Faith" Standard
Special circumstances could include agency bad faith or malicious
government tactics, such as the government having the SEC serve as a mere
conduit for a future criminal prosecution. Other circumstances weighing in favor
of granting a stay of the civil proceedings while criminal prosecutions are
pending include malicious prosecution, absence of counsel for the defendant
during depositions, or other "special circumstances.' 67  A bad faith SEC
165. Id. at *9.
166. Arthur F. Mathews, The Role of Outside Counsel, 61 N.C. L. REV. 483, 493
(1983).
167. Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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investigation is one conducted solely for criminal enforcement purposes. 6 ' As
long as the SEC is pursuing an active civil investigation, its investigation is in
good faith even if it later shares some of its information with the DOJ. 69
Although the choices presented to defendants met with parallel proceedings are
unpleasant, they are not illegal and must be faced. 7 '
Moreover, courts tend to be very supportive of SEC and DOJ cooperation.
For instance, in United States v. Szur,'7 ' in which the DOJ had formally
requested and been granted access to the SEC's investigative files, the court
denied the defendant's motion to quash the SEC's investigative subpoena in
order keep the DOJ from gaining access to evidence produced to the SEC,
holding that "[tihe SEC's general policy is to grant [the DOJ] continuing access
to the entirety of a given investigative file once the Commission formally grants
access."' 72 Defendants who accuse the SEC and DOJ of bad faith investigations
must have a substantial basis for such accusations. For example, where a
defendant's allegations that the SEC brought the civil proceeding solely to gain
evidence for the criminal proceeding is viewed by the court as merely
conclusory, the defendant's request for a stay will most likely be denied.'
Court findings of government abuse are not totally nonexistent, however.
For example, inAfro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States,'74 the court found government
abuse warranting a stay of the civil proceeding when government investigators
168. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 824 n.127 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
169. SEC v. Horowitz & Ullman, P.C., No. C80-590A, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11548, at *14 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 1982); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 793; SEC v.
Dresser, 628 F.2d 1368, 1387 (D.C. Cir 1980) (citing United States v. LaSalle Nat'l
Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 317 n.9 (1978)).
170. SEC v. Musella, No. 83 Civ. 342, 1983 WL 1297, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4,
1983).
171. No. 97cv108, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3896 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997).
172. Id. at *6 (citing Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1383); see also United States v. Teyibo,
877 F. Supp. 846, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 101 F.3d 681 (2d Cir. 1996) (ruling that
the use of evidence from an SEC civil proceeding is generally admissible in a subsequent
criminal trial if: (1) the SEC did not bring the action solely to obtain evidence for the
subsequent criminal trial; (2) the U.S. Attorney's Office conducted its own investigation;
and (3) the SEC properly informed the defendant that his testimony could be used against
him in subsequent criminal proceedings, so he had the right to refuse to testify based on
his privilege against self-incrimination); SEC v. Rubenstein, 95 F.R.D. 529, 531
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (in which Judge Lasker declined to impose any limitations on the United
States Attorney's use of discovery obtained from the SEC "in view of the clear statutory
authorization [of the SEC to provide the DOJ with discovery] and the prior judicial
interpretation of that authorization").
173. SEC v. Grossman, No. 87 Civ. 1031, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2213, at **3-4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. SEC v. Hirshberg, Nos.
97-6171, 97-6529, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4764 (2d Cir. March 18, 1999).
174. 820 F.2d 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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surreptitiously attended discovery meetings in parallel proceedings.' Still,
decisions such as Afro-Lecon are unusual and the civil proceeding will be
allowed to continue in the absence of specific agency bad faith.
Because the SEC's explicit mandate is to enforce the federal securities law,
the task of showing that the SEC is investigating alleged violations of those
securities laws solely for the purposes of providing the DOJ with evidence for
use in a criminal proceeding will be, at best, extremely difficult. As such, the
grant of a stay based upon a showing of agency bad faith will likely remain an
infrequent occurrence.
B. Modern Trends
In addition to the traditional "bad faith" standard, when deciding whether
or not to grant a stay pending resolution of a parallel criminal proceeding based
upon the presence of "special circumstances," modem courts generally consider
the following factors: (1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case
overlap with those presented in the civil case; (2) the status of the criminal case
at the time the motion is filed, including whether the defendants have been
indicted; (3) the interests of the courts; and (4) the public interest. 76
1. Issue Overlap
The most important factor in determining whether or not a court will grant
a stay of a civil proceeding pending the resolution of a parallel criminal
proceeding is "the degree to which the civil issues overlap with the criminal
issues."'177 If the civil proceeding involves alleged violations of a different
statute than does the criminal proceeding, then it cannot be said that the
proceedings will vindicate the same public interest and a pre-indictment stay is
not warranted. 78
175. Id. at 1200.
176. SEC v. Google, No. 3:95 cv 00420, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20878, at **7-8
(D. Conn. Apr. 30, 1997); Arden Way Assocs. v. Boesky, 660 F. Supp. 1494, 1497
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Maxus
Energy Corp., 925 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 199 1); Twenty First Century Corp. v. LaBianca, 801
F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Volmar Distrib. v. N.Y. Post Co., 152 F.R.D. 36,
39 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), dismissed, 899 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Milton
Pollack, Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 129 F.R.D. 201, 203-04 (1989).
177. Pollack, supra note 176, at 203.
178. In re Par Pharm., Inc. Secs. Litig., 133 F.R.D. 12, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(denying the defendants' motion for a limited stay of proceedings and for an order
staying discovery where the criminal investigation involved misconduct before the Food
and Drug Administration while the parallel civil action involved violations of federal
securities laws); Metzler v. Bennett, No. 97-CV-0148, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5441, at
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As was stated in the introduction, the focus of this Article is on parallel
proceedings where the SEC brings a civil proceeding while the DOJ, through the
respective United States Attorney's Office, brings a criminal proceeding for
alleged violations of the securities laws. Therefore, because issue overlap and,
subsequently, the danger of self-incrimination both exist, one factor that warrants
the issuance of a stay will be constant within this focus. This factor has not been
determinative, however. The lack of issue overlap will generally result in the
denial of a motion for a stay, but the presence of issue overlap does not
necessarily result in the granting of a motion for a stay.'79
2. Status of the Criminal Proceeding
The status of the criminal proceeding at the time of the motion is another
important factor that courts consider. A cursory glance at SEC/DOJ parallel
proceedings might tend to leave an observer with the impression that courts deny
the motion for a stay when an indictment has not been returned 8 ' and grant the
motion for a stay when an indictment has been returned.' 8 ' These trends are not
absolute, however.8 2 Although "[t]he strongest case for a stay of discovery in
the civil case occurs during a criminal prosecution after an indictment is
returned,"'83 courts will still deny the motion for a stay when they think that it is
**21-22 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1998) (denying the defendant's motion for a stay of the
civil proceeding where the defendant was a party to a civil ERISA proceeding and a
parallel criminal proceeding alleging securities fraud, even though the defendant had
already been indicted).
179. See Par Pharm., 133 F.R.D. at 14 (stating that "[a] pre-indictment stay is
particularly appropriate where both the civil and criminal charges arise from the same
remedial statute such that the criminal investigation is likely to vindicate the same public
interest as would the civil suit"). But see SEC v. Incendy, 936 F. Supp. 952, 953 (S.D.
Fla. 1996) (denying the defendant's motion for a stay where "[b]oth cases concern [the
defendant's] activities as a registered representative with various broker-dealers of
securities").
180. See SEC v. First Jersey Secs., Inc., No. 85 Civ. 8585, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10157, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 1450 (2d
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 812 (1997); SEC v. Zimmerman, 854 F. Supp. 896,
899-900 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (denying the defendant's request for a stay when no indictment
had been returned and no other evidence of "special circumstances" existed).
181. See Google, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20878, at *8 (granting the defendant's
request for a stay because the defendant was currently under indictment, regardless of the
late timing of the motion or the interests of the SEC, the public, and the court).
182. See Incendy, 936 F. Supp. at 953-54 (accepting the Report and
Recommendation of a Magistrate denying the defendant's request for a stay where the
degree of overlap between the civil and criminal issues was large and the defendant was
currently under indictment).
183. Pollack, supra note 176, at 203.
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in the interest of justice. For example, in SEC v. Thrasher,'84 a defendant who
was the subject of an SEC civil proceeding and a DOJ criminal action (for which
he had already been indicted) had fled to Australia and resided there during a
period of nearly two years when a stay of the civil proceeding had been issued
for the purposes of resolving criminal charges against a co-defendant. The court
held that no interest ofjustice was served by a stay of the civil proceeding where
the defendant had left thejurisdiction, "apparently without the intention to return
to face the pending criminal charges," and denied the defendant's motion for a
stay.'85 This is an excellent example of the rule that a civil defendant who is
under indictment has no automatic right to a stay. 186 Ultimately, the inherent
power to grant a stay belongs to the court.
187
3. Judicial Efficiency
Judicial efficiency is another factor that is considered by courts when
deciding whether or not to grant a stay. "A guilty verdict would likely have a
collateral estoppel' or res judicata effect on this case, but even a trial resulting
in acquittal could expose the strengths and weaknesses of each side, thereby
assisting settlement discussions." ' 9 This factor ties in with issue overlap, as
collateral estoppel (and its resulting benefit to judicial efficiency) can only apply
to the extent that the issues overlap between the civil and criminal proceeding.
4. The Public Interest
The public has a strong interest in the timely resolution of federal agency
civil enforcement actions. 9° As enunciated by the Dresser court, "[e]ffective
enforcement of the securities laws may require prompt civil and criminal
enforcement, and neither proceeding can always await the completion of the
parallel proceeding without jeopardizing the public interest in protection of the
efficient working securities markets and of investors from the dissemination of
false and misleading information."''
184. No. 92 Civ. 6987, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10775 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2,1995).
185. Id. at **47-48.
186. SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
187. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n.27 (1970).
188. For a further discussion of collateral estoppel effects in parallel proceedings,
see supra Part V.D.
189. SEC v. HGI, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 3866, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17377, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1999); see also Pollack, supra note 176, at 204.
190. SEC v. Gilbert, 79 F.R.D. 683, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
191. Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1377; SEC v. Incendy, 936 F. Supp. 952, 955 (S.D. Fla.
1996); see also SECv. First Fin. Group of Texas, 659 F.2d 660,667 (5th Cir. 1981); SEC
v. Zimmerman, 854 F. Supp. 896, 900 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (all noting the public interest in
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The Author found no cases where an SEC/DOJ parallel proceeding
addressed an issue that was not found to be a matter of public interest. Although
courts have found other alleged violations to be not so damaging to the public
interest as to justify denying a stay on those grounds,'9 2 alleged violations of
securities laws have continued to be viewed by courts as sufficiently damaging
to the public interest to justify denial of a stay. For instance, in SEC v.
Grossman,' where the defendant was receiving living and attorney's expenses
from funds that were otherwise frozen by a judicial order, the court held that
"staying this case pending completion could result in lengthy delay, and thus
serious injury, to the public interest."' 94 In the future, given the recent increased
volatility of the markets due to factors such as expanded access to research on
publicly traded companies and more efficient trading methods via the Internet,
parallel proceedings based upon alleged violations of federal securities laws will
most likely continue to be viewed as important matters of public interest and a
strong priority for government agencies.
VIII. CRITICISMS OF PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS AND THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH CRITICISMS
The concept of parallel proceedings has faced heavy criticism. For
example, the American Bar Association has formally recognized the problems
associated with parallel proceedings and has called for statutory amendments to
protect defendants subjected to them.'95 Additionally, several commentators
the prompt completion of civil and criminal enforcement actions regarding violations of
the federal securities laws and denying the defendant's motion to stay civil proceedings
pending the outcome of the current criminal investigation).
192. See Brock v. Tolkow, 109 F.R.D. 116, 120 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that the
granting of a stay in a case of alleged ERISA violations will not injure the public interest
where no allegations exist that beneficiaries of an allegedly mismanaged pension fund
are not receiving benefits).
193. No. 87 Civ. 1031, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2213 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1987),
aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. SEC v. Hirshburg, Nos. 97-6171, 97-6259, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 4764 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 1999).
194. Id. at *5; see also SEC v. First Jersey Secs., Inc., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10157, at *1 8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1987) (where the court, in denying the defendant's
motion for a stay, held that, even though the defendant had sold its retail operations prior
to its request to stay civil proceedings, the public still had an interest in the prompt
resolution of the allegations against it for the purposes of promptjudicial redress, should
it be necessary).
195. See American Bar Association Resolution, adopted by the House of
Delegates, Report No. 108B (Feb. 8-9, 1993) ("Be it Resolved, that the American Bar
Association urges the appropriate committees of the Judicial Conference of the United
States to address problems that may arise as a result of parallel and concurrent civil and
criminal proceedings, including amendment of relevant federal procedural rules.").
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have sharply criticized parallel proceedings as being patently unfair to
defendants and unconstitutional. For example, one commentator has argued that,
based on problems defendants are faced with during parallel proceedings, "the
courts should adopt new standards or, in the alternative, Congress should enact
a statutory amendment in deciding when and if to grant a stay in the SEC's
proceeding when an indictment has not yet been returned." 96
No such amendments have been enacted, however. In fact, parallel
proceedings appear to be gaining rather than losing support. For example, in a
recent speech at the Financial Executives International 2002 Conference, SEC
Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman stated:
The heaviest hammer against financial fraud, of course, is criminal
prosecution and serious jail time. The new Corporate Fraud Task
Force, established by President Bush, is the latest step in what has
been a remarkable run of coordinated enforcement efforts between the
SEC and federal criminal authorities. This year, even before the Task
Force was put into place, approximately 75 criminal actions by 17
different U.S. Attorney's Offices and the Department of Justice were
taken with [the SEC's] assistance for securities related offenses or
obstruction of justice in our investigations. By the end of the fiscal
year, these figures had grown to 259 and 30.97
These comments by Commissioner Glassman obviously indicate a favorable
impression of cooperation between the SEC and DOJ and definitely lend the
impression that similar acts of cooperation in the future should be anticipated.
196. Eckers, supra note 120, at 113; see also Using Equitable Powers, supra note
124, at 1044 ("Parallel civil and criminal proceedings harm the accused by diminishing
the value of the protections provided by the privilege against self-incrimination, limited
prosecutorial discovery, and the assistance of counsel."). But see Ball & Pickett, supra
note 144, at 18 (explaining that parallel proceedings can provide a defendant with
excellent opportunities to obtain civil discovery to defend the criminal case).
197. See Cynthia A. Glassman, Remarks at the Financial Executives International
2002 Conference: Current Financial Reporting Issues (Nov. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch604a.htm.; see also Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks Before
the U.S. Department ofJustice Corporate Fraud Conference (Sept. 26, 2002), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch585.htm. ("The SEC has had, and continues to
have, a close relationship with its fellow law enforcement agencies. Indeed, some of the
most significant SEC actions over the last several months have been brought in tandem
with criminal complaints and indictments.").
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IX. WHY CRITICISM OF SEC/DOJ PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS IS
LARGELY INAPPROPRIATE
Criticism of the current framework for the resolution of SEC/DOJ parallel
proceedings is largely inappropriate. Allowing the SEC and the DOJ to freely
share evidence is appropriate, in light of the voluminous amount of evidence in
the form of paperwork that is common in actions regarding violations of the
federal securities laws. As SEC and DOJ hiring capabilities are not expanding
nearly as quickly as is the rate of parallel proceedings, this interagency
cooperation is an excellent method for preserving the resources of both agencies.
The "bad faith" standard that an SEC investigation is proper if it is not conducted
solely as a mechanism to generate evidence for the DOJ is the correct standard,
as it is very unlikely that the SEC has the resources to function solely as a
discovery mechanism for the DOJ while still meeting its congressionally-
mandated objectives.
By not intervening with a statutory amendment creating either an exception
to the various laws permitting cooperation between the SEC and the DOJ or a
more "bright line" test for determining when to stay a civil proceeding pending
the resolution of a parallel criminal proceeding, Congress has continued to allow
courts to retain discretion as to what constitutes "bad faith" on the parts of the
SEC and the DOJ, as well as when "special circumstances" exist that truly call
for a stay of the civil proceeding. This retained discretion will continue to allow
courts to be the sole determining body, rather than relying on legislative
amendments, a process that can be particularly slow and burdensome. Further,
by not implementing a "bright line" test as to when to stay a civil proceeding,
Congress makes the task of scheming for "loopholes" in the SEC and the DOJ's
regulatory scheme, a practice likely to occur immediately after any statutory
amendments, more difficult for potential wrongdoers. For example, if a "bright
line" test existed that mandated the issuance of a stay of an SEC civil proceeding
when a defendant is currently defending a post-indictment DOJ criminal
proceeding, then the Southern District of New York would have been required
to grant a stay in SECv. Thrasher,'98 in which the defendant had fled to Australia
with no apparent intention to return. Granting a stay under these circumstances
does not adequately address the "special circumstances" anticipated by the
Dresser and Kordel courts. It was the Thrasher court's discretion to either grant
or deny the stay that resulted in the most appropriate solution. Any "bright line"
test would damage this discretion and should be resisted.
One area where criticism of standards utilized in SEC/DOJ parallel
proceedings is appropriate, however, is the standard utilized by courts to grant
a stay of civil proceedings at the government's request, but denying a
defendant's request for the same. The SEC staff is in the best possible position
198. See supra Part VII.B.
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to determine when to initiate an action against a defendant. Therefore, once the
SEC initiates such an action, the standard for granting a stay to the SEC to
protect the DOJ from the criminal defendant being able to circumvent the narrow
criminal discovery rules should be identical to the standard for granting a stay to
a defendant to prevent the DOJ from doing the same. Although the court's
holding in Campbell v. Eastland.99 that "[a]dministrative policy gives priority to
the public interest in law enforcement" is well-reasoned, the mere fact that
defendants in SEC/DOJ parallel proceedings are faced with such extreme
limitations placed upon their privilege against self-incrimination is sufficient to
lend the public interest an adequate amount of priority. Accordingly, judicial
standards in granting stays of civil proceedings should be identical, regardless
of whether the stay is requested by the government or the defendant.
X. CONCLUSION
As the financial markets continue to evolve at an extremely brisk pace,
courts are best equipped to retain discretion and flexibility in determining what
situations require a stay of a civil proceeding "in the interests ofjustice." In light
of recent trends in securities law enforcement, parallel proceedings will most
likely continue to occur with even greater frequency, and trial courts will bear
the burden of balancing the competing interests to ensure the most equitable
outcome.
199. See supra Part VI.B.
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